ABSTRACT
§1. INTRODUCTION
Th e right of EU citizens to move freely within the EU Member States has evolved from a right for economically active persons (within the context of Europe's economic integration) to a right for all EU citizens whether or not they are economically active. In parallel, the fi ght against poverty and social exclusion is supposed to be at the core of the EU's political agenda. However, the right to free movement of economically non-active persons and to equal treatment with the host state's citizens with regard to social benefi ts is subject to having suffi cient resources so as not to become an unreasonable burden on the host state's social assistance system. As a result, indigent people could very well be deprived of the right to free movement in practice, which would amount to ambiguity between these two policy goals.
Quite a large number of Union citizens are aff ected by this issue. Indeed, according to the most recent fi gures published by Eurostat, 1 in 2013, 16.7% of the population of the European Union were at risk of income poverty, meaning that their disposable income was below their national at-risk-of-poverty threshold. 2 Th ese fi gures show that in total numbers more than 80 million EU citizens live under the poverty threshold.
Th e issue is also high on the political agenda. At the Council's request, the Commission published a study on this issue in October 2013. 3 In both the literature and consultations with the stakeholders little evidence can be found to suggest that the main motivation of EU citizens to migrate and reside in a diff erent Member State is benefi t-related as opposed to work or family-related. On 25 November 2013, the Commission published a Communication on the free movement of EU citizens which proposed fi ve points of action to help national and local authorities to eff ectively apply EU free movement rules and use available funds on the ground. 4 However, based on very anecdotal evidence, politicians and the popular press in several Member States openly criticized the fact that Union citizens from other Member States wanted to make use of the social assistance schemes of the host state. It is not uncommon for migration of this kind to be called 'benefi t tourism'. Some Member States' political leaders openly proposed to amend the rules on free movement, including the Treaty provisions, not only for economically inactive Union citizens but also for workers. 5 Th is article analyses the ambiguity within the Union's policy goals of free movement and the combating of poverty and social exclusion. It starts by reiterating the legal meaning of the right to free movement as well as the EU policy commitment to combat poverty. Next, it examines the current rules and the case law of the Court of Justice (CJEU) on the right to minimum subsistence benefi ts for migrant workers and persons who can Th is threshold is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income. 3 ICF and Milieu Ltd, 'A fact fi nding analysis on the impact on the Member States' social security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU-migrants to special non-contributory cash benefi ts and healthcare granted on the basis of residence', Website of the European Commission (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1980&furtherNews=yes#, p. 276.
12
22 MJ 1 (2015) rely on that status. Th e sometimes-blurred defi nition in EU law of who is economically active and who is not will also be examined. Th e possibilities and limitations for indigent (economically inactive migrant) Union citizens to obtain a right to reside in another Member State and have access to social minimum benefi ts there are also assessed. Th is article critically analyses the balance that the Court of Justice tried to strike in its recent judgment in Brey and Dano, between the free movement rights and the Member States' interest in limiting access to their solidarity systems. Finally, the article intends to present some ideas and proposals on how this ambiguity and these contradictions could be solved in order to guarantee the right to free movement for all, including the poor. §2 .
THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT WITHIN THE EU AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Th e right to free movement within the EU is fi rst and foremost a right for those who are economically active (Articles 45 and 49 TFEU). Th e Maastricht Treaty of 1992 complemented this purely economic integration context with a more politically oriented integration, most visibly expressed through the establishment of European citizenship. A key element of this European citizenship was the creation of the Union citizens' right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, irrespective of the exercise of an economic activity, but subject to the limitations and restrictions laid down by Union law (Article 8A EEC Treaty and now Article 21 TFEU). Th is right is also enshrined in Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Th e CJEU has recognized the direct eff ect of Article 21 TFEU, confi rming that this right is conferred directly on every Union citizen. 6 Th e CJEU also observed that Union citizenship confers on each citizen a primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 7 Th e CJEU qualifi ed this freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States as a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty 8 which must be interpreted broadly. 9 Hence, limitations and conditions laid down in EU law must be interpreted restrictively and applied in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 10 In Grzelczyk, the Court stated that the status of Union citizen is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 13 Member States, a statement which later became paradigmatic, since it was repeated on numerous occasions in subsequent case law. 11 Th e Court also added that every Union citizen therefore may rely on the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 18 TFEU in situations relating to the exercise of the right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for). 12 Th e right to move and reside freely on the territory of the Member States and the right to equal treatment is fi rmly endorsed in the Treaty provisions as well as in the case law of the CJEU as a fundamental right of every EU citizen, regardless of whether the person exercises an economic activity. It has constitutional status in EU law. 13 Th e main objective of these European policy initiatives is to support the Member States in their national policies to combat poverty. However, they do not have a direct impact on legal claims for fi nancial or other support by persons faced with poverty or social exclusion. Still, these objectives have found their way into legal instruments of the EU, and more specifi cally into the Treaties as amended in the Lisbon Treaty (in force on 1 December 2009). Article 9 TFEU declares that 'in defi ning and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to (…) the fi ght against social exclusion (…)'. Furthermore, Article 3(3) TEU states that the construction of the internal market is to be realized by means of policies based on 'a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress'. Th is article also confi rms that '[i]t [meaning the EU] shall combat social exclusion (…)'. Article 151(1) TFEU also refers to the combating of social exclusion as an objective of the Union and the Member States. Article 34(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights refl ects these goals, stating that in order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack suffi cient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national law and practices.
Furthermore, Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that human dignity is inviolable and must be protected and respected.
Th ere is no doubt that the fi ght against poverty and social exclusion is a policy objective which is high on the political agenda of the European institutions and supported by provisions in the Treaties as well as in the Charter. §4 Th e personal scope of these provisions has been interpreted very broadly by the CJEU. Any person pursuing activities which are real and genuine, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, must be regarded as a 'worker'. 19 Th e origin of the funds from which the remuneration is paid or the limited amount of that remuneration do not impact a person's status as a 'worker'. 20 Th e fact that the income from employment is lower than the minimum required for subsistence does not prevent a person employed from being regarded as a 'worker' within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU, Regulation 1612/68 and what is now Regulation 492/2011. 21 Th is is also the case when the person in question seeks to supplement that remuneration by other means of subsistence such as fi nancial assistance drawn from the public funds of the state in which he/she resides. 22 Furthermore, regarding the duration of the activity pursued, the fact that employment is of short duration does not exclude in itself such employment from the scope of Article 45 TFEU. 23 Moreover, in the view of the Court, the income can also consist of an indirect contribution, such as board and lodging. 24 Th is case law was recently reconfi rmed by the Court of Justice. 25, 26 Yet, this case law also implies that it is not always easy to draw the line between 'work' that falls under these defi nitions and 'work' that does not. 27 week does a person have to work for his/her employment to be considered as 'real and genuine' and not as 'purely marginal and ancillary'? Chores in return for food, lodging and pocket money were considered 'work' in Steymann but not in Trojani. 28 And in Bettray, 'work merely as a means of rehabilitation and reintegration' was not considered as an economic activity by the CJEU. It is also clear from the defi nition of 'worker' that volunteers are excluded since they do not receive any remuneration, despite the fact that they may contribute to the host state's development. 29 Apart from that, the provisions on residence rights in Directive 2004/38 30 show that there can be no resources requirement vis-à-vis citizens of other Member States who can prove that they are working as employed or self-employed persons falling within the scope of the CJEU's case law. Th e same applies to their family members. 31 Th is case law suggests that indigent migrant workers and self-employed persons, in the very broad sense of these terms, can claim social assistance and other minimum benefi ts in the host country where they are economically active, and on an equal footing with the nationals of this host country. Th is is even the case when these workers only provide a limited contribution to the economy of the host state. Th e social integration into the host society is seen by the CJEU as an instrument for promoting participation in the EU internal market and its economic goals of free movement of factors of production, even if their 'productivity' is rather low. Th e rationale behind this case law has more to do with the 'internal market' than with 'combating of social exclusion', even if this actually contributes to the latter. For the Court, being economically active constitutes a suffi cient link of integration, inter alia, because migrant workers also contribute to the fi nancing of the social policies of the host state by paying taxes. 32 Yet, in other and more recent case law, the CJEU seems to depart from this mechanical application of the equal treatment provisions concerning migrant workers' claims for social benefi ts. In Geven, the Court had to rule on the refusal of the competent German authorities to grant a child-raising allowance to a Dutch national who resided in the Netherlands and worked between 3 and 14 hours a week in Germany. In its judgment, the Court accepted as appropriate the justifi cation according to which the measure intended to encourage the birth rate in Germany and that it should be limited to migrant workers having a suffi cient link with Germany. For the CJEU, the fact that a non-resident worker does not have a suffi ciently substantial occupation in the Member State concerned constitutes a legitimate justifi cation for refusing to grant the social advantage at issue. 33 Giersch dealt with the claim for study grants for children of a frontier migrant worker, who worked in Luxembourg but resided in France. Th e CJEU argued that a frontier worker is not always integrated in the Member State of employment in the same way as a worker who is resident in that Member State. Th e CJEU stated that in order to avoid the risk of 'study grant forum shopping' and to ensure that the tax paying frontier worker who also pays social security contributions in Luxembourg has a suffi cient link with Luxembourg, the fi nancial aid could be made conditional on the frontier worker having worked in that Member State for a certain minimum period. Th e CJEU suggested a period of fi ve years. 34 Geven and Giersch constitute a remarkable departure from previous case law, since the CJEU seems to indicate that migrant workers can no longer in all circumstances claim equal treatment in the Member State where they work and fi rst have to demonstrate suffi cient integration into the society of the host Member State before they can claim a benefi t. Th is would amount to the introduction of a 'genuine link' requirement which the CJEU has so far only applied for economically inactive migrants. 35 Some submitted that the Court did not respect the boundaries between its case law on workers and its case law on citizenship. 36 Others called this 'cross-pollination' between the free movement of citizens and workers. 37 It remains to be seen if the CJEU will continue in this vein in its future case law.
B. THE RIGHT TO MINIMUM SUBSISTENCE BENEFITS IN THE HOST STATE FOR INACTIVE MIGRANTS WHO CAN RELY ON THE STATUS OF 'WORKER'

First time jobseekers
In a number of cases, the CJEU also brought jobseekers within the scope of these EU provisions on the right of free movement for workers. As a result, persons looking for a job in a Member State other than their own for the fi rst time were able to claim the 38 Th is right also applies to fi nancial benefi ts intended to facilitate access to employment on the labour market of a Member State. Th e CJEU confi rmed this approach in its subsequent case law. 39 In this context it referred to the adoption of EU citizenship in Article 17 EC (now Article 20 TFEU). 40 However, the Court considered it legitimate for a Member State to grant such an allowance only aft er a real link between the jobseeker and the labour market of that Member State has been ascertained. 41 Th e existence of such a link can be more specifi cally determined by establishing that the person concerned has for a reasonable period genuinely sought work in the Member State in question. 42 According to this case law, an economically inactive person, such as a jobseeker, coming to a Member State with the intention of looking for a job may invoke provisions with regard to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality initially aimed at workers against the Member State where this person seeks employment. Th is right to equal treatment can also refer to a social minimum benefi t as in Collins, which concerned the means-tested jobseekers allowance in the UK, or in Vatsouras and Koupatantze, which concerned a dispute with regard to a German basic benefi t in favour of jobseekers.
Former migrant workers
Other categories of economically inactive persons can also invoke the EU provisions regarding the free movement of workers and the principle of equal treatment included therein. Indeed, the European legislator confi rmed in Article 7(3) Directive 2004/38 that in certain circumstances an EU citizen can maintain his/her status as an employee or self-employed person. Th is is the case where the Union citizen is temporarily unable to work as a result of illness or accident, or is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment, or embarks on vocational training. 43 In these circumstances the person concerned not only retains the right to reside in the host state, but, on the basis of Article 24( country with regard to all kinds of social benefi ts, including study fi nance grants for persons undergoing vocational training.
In 2009, the CJEU expressly confi rmed this in Vatsouras and Koupatantze concerning a dispute about a German basic benefi t in favour of jobseekers. 44 Normally, this category will be entitled to a number of social security benefi ts such as unemployment benefi ts or compensation for incapacity for work. However, this does not rule out that individuals in this category, because of the low amount of this benefi t, fi nd themselves in a state of destitution and have to ask for additional social assistance or other social minimum benefi ts.
Moreover, the CJEU recently confi rmed that the list in Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 containing the circumstances in which migrant workers who are no longer in an employment relationship may nevertheless continue to benefi t from that status is not exhaustive. In Saint-Prix, the Court stated that a woman who gives up work or gives up seeking work because of the physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy and the aft ermath of childbirth retains the status of 'worker' within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU, provided she returns to work or fi nds a job within a reasonable period aft er the birth of the child. 45 Th erefore, being economically active does not appear to be an absolute prerequisite for entitlement to equal treatment with workers in the host state. Th ose who fi nd themselves in an intermediate situation because they are (temporarily) unemployed or started vocational training remain covered by the provisions applicable to migrant workers.
Family members of migrant workers or former migrant workers
Furthermore, the right to access to social minimum benefi ts also applies to workers' or ex-workers' economically inactive family members, even when they are no longer living together with the worker in the host state. Th is was illustrated by the Court's judgments in Ibrahim and Teixeira. 46 Th ese cases concerned single mothers who were economically inactive and had applied for housing assistance in the UK. Th eir request was denied under the argument that their right of residence and that of their children was not based on EU law. To demonstrate that it did rest on EU law, both mothers invoked Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 (now Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011). Th is provision grants the children of EU migrant workers the right to access to general education, apprenticeship and vocational training. In these judgments the CJEU confi rmed its earlier case law that, pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, the children of an EU citizen who have settled in a Member State during their parent's exercise of rights of residence as a migrant worker in that Member 44 Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, para. 31-32. 45 Case C-507/12 Saint-Prix. State are entitled to reside there in order to attend general educational courses. 47 Th e fact that the parents of the children concerned have meanwhile divorced and the fact that the parent who exercised rights of residence as a migrant worker is no longer economically active in the host Member State is irrelevant. It is suffi cient that the child settled in the Member State concerned at the time that one of the parents resided there as a migrant worker. 48 Th e Court also ruled that as a consequence of the children's right to reside, the parents who are their carers must be allowed to remain in the host Member State during the period of their children's education. 49 Th is means that these economically inactive family members of a person who at one time worked as a migrant worker in the host country can continue to invoke the status of a family member of a worker within the meaning of Regulation 1612/68 (now Regulation 492/2011) with a view to maintaining an autonomous right of residence while the children pursue an education. Th is right of residence will not be subject to the conditions for the right of residence in Directive 2004/38 for economically inactive migrants. As a result of their EU status as family members of a worker they will also be able to claim the social benefi ts the host Member State grants to persons lawfully residing in their territory (such as housing assistance in Ibrahim and Texeira). 50 From this case law, it can be inferred that even when they are inactive, in quite a number of circumstances migrant persons within the EU can claim rights linked to the status of worker in the host Member State, including the access to social assistance or other social minimum benefi ts. Th is also applies to certain family members of such workers, even when the worker ceased to be economically active in the host Member State or has returned to his Member State of origin. In these cases, the link with the exercise of one of the economic freedoms of the internal market becomes rather distant. So perhaps the Court's fi rst objective in these judgments is the combating of social exclusion even if it does not mention this objective specifi cally. Th is EU social security coordination system guarantees that persons migrating within the EU can keep their social security allowances (export of benefi ts) or have access to benefi ts in the new host country through the mechanism of aggregation of periods or the right to equal treatment. Th erefore, this coordination is an important instrument in preventing poverty as a result of exercising this right to free movement.
Regulation 883/2004 applies to all branches of social security. 53 Yet, social assistance is excluded from the scope of this coordination, 54 even though the Court of Justice has always interpreted this exclusion quite narrowly. In its case law during the 1970s and 1980s, the CJEU developed a broad defi nition of social security within the meaning of Regulation 1408/71. Th is also included special non-contributory benefi ts that are halfway between traditional social security and social assistance and to which the CJEU applied the export provision. 55 Examples of such benefi ts are supplements to pensions and special benefi ts for disabled or invalid persons.
In response to this case law, the EU legislature intervened in 1992 by creating a special coordination system for these benefi ts. 56 For the benefi ts listed in the newly created Annex IIa of Regulation 1408/71, Member States could apply a residence condition preventing the export of these benefi ts. As a consequence, a benefi ciary of such a benefi t would, on the Regulation 1408/71 concerning the application of the social security schemes to employees and selfemployed persons, as well as to their family members travelling within the Community. 53 Article 3 of Regulation 883/2004 refers to the following branches of social security: sickness benefi ts; maternity and equivalent paternity benefi ts; invalidity benefi ts; old-age benefi ts; survivors' benefi ts; benefi ts in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases; death grants; unemployment benefi ts; pre-retirement benefi ts and family benefi ts. one hand, lose it when transferring his/her residence to another Member State and would, on the other, be entitled in his/her new Member State of residence to benefi ts of that state listed in Annex IIa. Even prior submission to the host Member State's social security legislation was no longer required. 57 Th is entitlement in the Member State of residence is seen as a compensation for the non-exportability of these benefi ts. 58 Th e justifi cation for limiting the export of these benefi ts was mainly that they were not based on the payment of contributions by the benefi ciary and were meant to guarantee a level of subsistence taking account of the cost of living and integration in a particular Member State. Th is purpose would be lost if it were to be granted outside the Member State of residence. 59 Article 70 However, the CJEU recently decided that these 'special non-contributory cash benefi ts' must also be qualifi ed as 'social assistance' within the meaning of the provisions of Directive 2004/38. 60 Th is qualifi cation has important consequences for the entitlement of migrant persons to these benefi ts in the host state. Indeed, Article 14(1) of Directive 2004/38 provides that Union citizens have the right to three months' residence in the host Member State, as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. Moreover, the right of residence for more than three months and the retention of this right for economically inactive persons is conditional upon the citizens having suffi cient resources for themselves and their family members so as not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State (Article 7(1(b)) and Article 14(2) of Directive 2004/38). It is only once a Union citizen has acquired the right to permanent residence within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38 (aft er fi ve years of legal residence) that his/her right to reside is not subject to any conditions.
In Dano, the CJEU specifi ed that economically inactive Union citizens cannot claim equal treatment with nationals of the host state for these 'special non-contributory 
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cash benefi ts' in the fi rst three months of residence. For periods of residence longer than three months but shorter than fi ve years they are only entitled to equal treatment for these benefi ts if their residence complies with the provisions of Directive 2004/38. Th e latter is only the case if such an economically inactive Union citizen has suffi cient resources for himself/herself and his/her family members. 61 Th is case law actually adds a supplementary condition to the entitlement to these benefi ts which is not included in Regulation 883/2004 itself. Clearly, the recent judgments of the Court make it more diffi cult for economically inactive EU migrants in the future to rely on the social minimum benefi ts listed in Annex X to Regulation 883/2004. It is not doubted that this result jeopardizes the right to free movement of indigent persons. 62 
D. THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT FOR ECONOMICALLY INACTIVE PERSONS AND EQUAL TREATMENT IN THE HOST STATE FOR MINIMUM SUBSISTENCE BENEFITS
Th e above analysis shows that a large number of persons migrating within the EU can invoke the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality to exercise rights regarding social minimum benefi ts in the host country because of their status as workers or self-employed persons or a status linked to this capacity. However, if migrant Union citizens do not belong to the category of economically active or post-active persons, their recourse to social assistance in the host Member State is much more controversial, both legally and politically. Th e starting point of the discussion is the statement by the Court of Justice that noneconomic migration between Member States also triggers the application of the Treaty prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in the host Member State (now Article 18 TFEU). 63 In its case law prior to the coming into force of Directive 2004/38, the CJEU confi rmed that this principle also applies to social assistance benefi ts, 64 as well as to other non-contributory benefi ts, such as student maintenance grants. 65 Nevertheless, in these rulings the CJEU accepted possible justifi cations for derogations of equal treatment with regard to social minimum benefi ts, provided the proportionality test is met.
Th e CJEU actually took a traditional 'functional approach' in its interpretation of the Treaty provision on the free movement of persons. Indeed, in this case law, Union citizenship appears to be an instrument to increase mobility within the EU. 66 However, 61 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 69-76. 62 See further on this case Section 3.D. 63 See for the fi rst time Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala, EU:C:1998:217; and most recently confi rmed in Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 59. the Court did not grant economically inactive migrants unconditional access to the welfare benefi ts of the host Member State. Depending on the case, the applicant should 'not become an unreasonable burden on the public fi nances', 67 'have a genuine link with the employment market of the State concerned', 68 or 'need to demonstrate a certain degree of integration into the society of the host State'. 69 For the Court, requiring a genuine link with the host Member State could refl ect a legitimate objective, capable of justifying restrictions on the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States. 70 It would seem that the requirement of a genuine link with the host Member State is an attempt to strike a fair balance between the rights of economically inactive migrants and the Member States' legitimate wish to protect their national welfare systems. 71 Th is approach is refl ected by the EU legislation in Directive 2004/38. Th is directive provides in Article 24(2) for a derogation of the principle of equal treatment for social assistance during the fi rst three months of residence of economically inactive persons, for jobseekers as long as they continue to seek employment and have a genuine chance of being engaged and, for students, even during the fi rst fi ve years as regards maintenance aid for studies. 72 In addition, Article 14(1) provides that Union citizens have the right to three months of residence in the host Member State, as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. Moreover, the right of residence for more than three months and the retention of this right for economically inactive persons is conditional upon the citizens having suffi cient resources for themselves and their family members so as not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State (Article 7(1(b)) and Article 14(2) Directive 2004/38). 73 It is only aft er fi ve years of legal residence in the host Member State that a migrant EU citizen is granted the right to permanent residence (Article 16), and this is no longer subject to any subsistence requirement. It off ers the citizen in question a full right to equal treatment with the nationals of that state, including for matters of social assistance.
In Ziolkowski and Szeja, the Court confi rmed that those conditions are intended to prevent Union citizens from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. 74 In Brey, it stated that these provisions are based on the idea that the exercise of the right of residence can be subordinated to legitimate concerns of the Member States, such as the protection of their public fi nances. 75 And in Dano, the Court stated that Article 7(1)(b) 'seeks to prevent economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State's welfare system to fund their means of subsistence ' . 76 Yet, aft er the entry into force of Directive 2004/38, discussions continued on what exactly could be considered as an 'unreasonable burden', which benefi ts should be regarded as social assistance and if the Member State of residence could subject access to social benefi ts to compliance with the necessary requirements for obtaining a legal right of residence in the host Member State on the basis of this Directive.
In its most recent case law, the CJEU tried to fi nd an answer to these questions. First, the Court defi ned the concept of 'social assistance' in Directive 2004/38 as referring to all assistance schemes established by the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local level, to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources suffi cient to meet his own basic needs and the needs of his family and who by reason of that fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public fi nances of the host Member State which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State. 77 Th is concept of social assistance includes the 'special non-contributory cash benefi ts' listed in Annex X to Regulation 883/2004. 78 In addition, the Court stated in Brey that national authorities cannot conclude that the person has become an unreasonable burden without fi rst carrying out an overall assessment of the specifi c burden which granting that benefi t would place on the national social assistance system as a whole, by reference to the personal circumstances characterizing the individual situation of the person concerned. Th e Court indicated that the national authorities may take into account, inter alia, the amount and the regularity of the income which the economically inactive migrant person receives, the fact that those factors have led those authorities to issue him/her with a certifi cate of residence and the period during which the benefi t applied for is likely to be granted to him/her. In addition, in order to ascertain more precisely the extent of the burden which that grant would place on the national social assistance system, the Court considers that it may be relevant, agreeing on that point with the Commission, 'to determine the proportion of the benefi ciaries of that benefi t who are Union citizens in receipt of a retirement pension in another Member State'. 79 It seems that with this judgment the CJEU has increased rather than alleviated the legal uncertainty and confusion created by its previous case law referred to above, in particular when it comes to determining what is an 'unreasonable burden'. 80 Indeed, it remained very unclear on the basis of which elements and according to which procedure the national court should make such an assessment, meaning Brey only created more confusion and legal uncertainty.
In its ruling of 11 November 2014 in Dano, the Court attempted to clarify this. In essence, the Court stated that economically inactive Union citizens can only claim equal treatment for social benefi ts with nationals of the host state, as guaranteed by the States have the possibility of refusing to grant social benefi ts to Union citizens who exercise their right to free movement solely in order to obtain another Member State's social assistance benefi ts although, upon arriving in the territory of that state, they do not have suffi cient resources to claim a right to reside. In order to determine whether these persons meet the latter condition, their fi nancial situation should be examined in detail, without taking account of the social benefi ts claimed.
However, this judgment allows both a strict interpretation and a broad interpretation of the possibilities the host Member States would have in order to deny a Union citizen the right to equal treatment as regards social benefi ts. As far as a strict interpretation is concerned, one could deduce from paragraphs 78 and 66 of this judgment that the Court limits the scope of the derogation from the equal treatment principle to situations in which Union citizens' only motive for moving to another Member State is to obtain social assistance. Th is means that it should be clear from the very beginning of their residence that they have no intention of integrating into the host society (for instance by 79 Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 78. taking up or seeking employment). Such a derogation would be justifi ed as it is intended to prevent 'benefi t tourism' and an unreasonable burden on the host state's social assistance system. In such cases, no further proportionality test or 'genuine link' test would be required. Th at would explain why in this judgment the Court does not refer at all to the proportionality test as defi ned in Articles 8(4), 14(3) and recital 16 of Directive 2004/38 and to which the Court referred to in its previous case law, including Brey. In all other circumstances, the limitations to the right to equal treatment should continue to be subject to such a test, in the context of which the Court also held that the genuine link required between the person claiming a benefi t and the host Member State should be established according to the constitutive elements of the benefi t in question, including its nature and purpose or purposes. 81 Th is strict interpretation of the derogation from the equal treatment principle as outlined above would be in line with the legal context of the right to free movement as a fundamental right, requiring each derogation to this principle to be strictly defi ned and proportionate. 82 In this sense, the term 'benefi t tourism' is limited to situations in which the motives or intentions of the migrant Union citizen are 'solely to obtain another Member State's social assistance'. 83 Consequently, other situations in which a migrating Union citizen claims social benefi ts in the host state, but did not move to the host state solely to obtain such benefi ts, should not be qualifi ed as 'benefi t tourism'.
Yet, the wording of this judgment would also allow a broader interpretation of the possibilities the host Member State would have to derogate from the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality for the granting of social benefi ts to economically inactive Union citizens. First, in paragraph 69 (to which paragraph 81 explicitly refers) the Court states that 'a Union citizen can claim equal treatment with nationals of the host Member State only if his residence in the territory of the host Member State complies with the conditions of Directive 2004/38' (emphasis added). In paragraph 73, the CJEU states that for those persons whose period of residence in the host Member State has been longer than three months but shorter than fi ve years, Article 7(1)(b) subjects the right to reside to 'the requirement that the economically inactive Union citizen must have suffi cient resources for himself and his family members'. Accordingly, the Court adds in paragraph 82 that national legislation may exclude nationals of other Member States who do not have a right of residence under Directive 2004/38 in the host Member State from entitlement to certain 'special noncontributory cash benefi ts'. 81 See to that eff ect, Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, para. 41 and 42; Case C-103/08 Gottwald, para. 34; and Case C-75/11 Commission v. Austria, para. 63. Moreover, the Court does not limit the exceptions to the equal treatment provisions to social assistance benefi ts alone. In paragraph 73 as well as in paragraphs 74, 77 and 78, the Court refers to the claim of 'social benefi ts' in general, without, however, defi ning this concept and despite the fact that elsewhere the Court qualifi ed the German benefi t at stake as a 'social assistance benefi t' (paragraph 63). In paragraph 76, the Court even refers to the 'Member State's welfare system' 84 and says that 'Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 seeks to prevent economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State's welfare system to fund their means of subsistence'. Yet, the 'welfare system', 'le système de protection sociale' or 'das System der sozialen Sicherheit' is far more than only the 'social assistance system' of the Member States to which Article 7(1) (c) refers. In addition, these paragraphs are worded very generally and no reference at all is made to a proportionality test, and any reference to the initial motives of the migrating Union citizens is also lacking both in these paragraphs as well as in the Court's dictum. It is submitted that such a broad interpretation would be contrary to the abovementioned principles and objectives of the EU on the free movement for persons, including those who are or who become economically inactive. 85 It remains to be seen 84 Th e French version of the judgment, from which the translations in the other languages are made, uses the term 'le système de protection sociale' and the German translation speaks of 'das System der sozialen Sicherheit'. 
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whether the Court would indeed adopt such broad interpretation in its future case law. Th erefore, it is necessary to await further case law of the Court in this matter in order to know exactly what the consequences will be. Th e Court will undoubtedly be confronted with new cases on these issues, the advantage of which is that it will have the opportunity to clarify its case law further. 86 §5. FREE MOVEMENT: INCLUDING FOR THE POOR?
Th e above analysis reveals the ambiguity between the EU's objective of guaranteeing the right to free movement of persons and equal treatment on the one hand and the objective of fi ghting poverty and social exclusion on the other.
Th is is related to the concern, as expressed for example in Directive 2004/38 and recognized by the case law of the Court of Justice, to prevent economically inactive migrants from becoming an unreasonable burden on the host Member State's social assistance system. Th erefore, the exercise of the right of residence can be subordinated to legitimate concerns of the Member States, such as the protection of their public fi nances. As we already pointed out in the introduction, this concern of the Member States as well as the danger of so-called 'benefi t tourism' has been much publicized lately. Th e balance the Court of Justice has had to fi nd is not just a balance between legal and political objectives at EU level but also between these objectives and the Member States' interests. Th e fact that since 2004, the Union has been expanding with a number of Member States whose standard of living is lower than that in the older Member States certainly has something to do with this. 87 Nevertheless, recent studies of the European Commission show that migration within the EU is only inspired by this benefi t tourism to a small extent. 88 Th e fi ndings of this study can be summarized as follows: non-active EU migrants represent a very small share of the total population in each Member State. On average, EU migrants are more likely to be employed than nationals living in the same country. Pensioners, students and jobseekers accounted for more than two-thirds of the non-active EU migrant population (71%) in 2012. Th e vast majority of non-active EU migrants (79%) live in economically active households and the majority of them have previously worked in the current country of residence (64%). Evidence also shows that the vast majority of migrants move to fi nd (or take up) employment and that this remains the key motive for intra-EU migration. Moreover, activity rates among such migrants have increased over the last 7 years. Th e study found little evidence in the literature and stakeholder consultations to suggest that the main motivation of EU citizens to migrate and reside in another Member State is benefi t-related as opposed to work or family-related. Th is is underpinned by data showing that in most countries, immigrants are not more intensive users of welfare than nationals.
Th erefore, one could wonder why the entitlement to social benefi ts for economically inactive migrating Union citizens is an issue at all. It could very well be more a matter of perception and political sensitivity than of reality. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the entitlement of indigent EU migrants to social minimum benefi ts in the host state is more disputed than ever. Th is clearly aff ects the way the CJEU handles this issue. As recently illustrated by its judgment in Brey and Dano, the Court tries to reconcile the right to free movement, including that for inactive persons, with the Member States' justifi ed concerns to protect their social system from unwanted intruders.
Meanwhile some ideas have been put forward for new legislative initiatives in this fi eld. 89 One of the ideas could be to extend the waiting period of three months in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 before a migrating economically inactive person is entitled to social assistance benefi ts in the host state. In the interim period, such a person would continue to be entitled to the social assistance benefi ts of his/her home state, which would then be obliged to export these benefi ts.
Introducing a cost compensation mechanism between the former Member State of residence and the new state of residence for residence-based minimum subsistence benefi ts could also alleviate the burden on the latter state. Such a system would entail the reimbursement by the fi rst Member State of the benefi ts paid by the latter. It could be limited to a certain length of time (one year), aft er which the host state would take over the fi nancial responsibility for the payment of social minimum benefi ts. suggested, so that the cost of providing such minimum support would be shared and distributed amongst all the Member States. 90 Th is solution would prevent an indigent migrant person from falling between two stools in this period. Such a person would at any time be entitled to social minimum benefi ts in some Member State. However, the political feasibility of such compensation schemes is questionable.
Others plead for the adoption of an EU instrument regarding the minimum income the Member States would have to provide to the persons living on their territory. 91 Such an instrument could take the form of an EU Framework Directive on the adequacy of minimum income schemes, which would include agreed common criteria. 92 Th e European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) has made a number of concrete proposals regarding such a Framework Directive on Minimum Income. 93 However, it remains uncertain whether the Treaties contain a legal basis for such an instrument, and it is even more uncertain whether there is the political will to adopt it. 94 A comparable idea would be the adoption of an EU instrument introducing common standards for the protection of vulnerable people in need, including basic forms of support, shelter and aid for the destitute and homeless. Such standards should correspond to the basic human rights responsibilities of the Member States. 95 Interestingly enough, such an instrument already exists for a specifi c category of third-country nationals, namely asylum seekers. Indeed, Directive 2003/9 on minimum standards for the reception of third-country asylum seekers provides for the obligation of Member States to take measures with regard to material reception conditions in order to ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence. Th e Directive specifi es that the 'material reception conditions' shall mean reception conditions that include housing, food and clothing, provided in kind or as fi nancial allowances or in vouchers, and a daily expenses allowance. 96 Moreover, the 90 Member States are required to adjust the reception conditions to the situation of persons with specifi c needs, such as minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or serious forms of violence (Articles 17-20) .
In a recent judgment, the CJEU confi rmed that these provisions observe the fundamental right laid down in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, under which human dignity must be respected and protected. According to the CJEU, where a Member State has opted to provide the material reception conditions in the form of fi nancial allowances, those allowances must be suffi cient to ensure a dignifi ed standard of living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence by enabling them to obtain housing, if necessary, on the private rental market. 97 Comparable obligations are also laid down in the recently adopted Directive 2013/33 which will replace Directive 2003/9 from 21 July 2015. 98 Th erefore, EU law obliges Member States to provide an adequate standard of living for all third-country nationals present on their territory who have applied for international protection. Th e CJEU has explicitly linked this requirement to the obligation under Article 1 of the EU Charter to respect human dignity. Th erefore, suggesting that such a requirement should also be introduced for indigent EU citizens who have made use of their fundamental right to free movement would be very reasonable.
Moreover, recently the EU has set up a fund in order to support the Member States in providing material assistance to the most deprived. Th e Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) created by Regulation 223/2014 99 and worth € 3.8 billion in real terms from 2014-2020, will fi nancially support Member States' actions to provide a broad range of non-fi nancial material assistance including food, clothing and other essential goods for personal use for materially deprived people. It complements the Structural Funds. Th e FEAD is a recent example of how the EU could alleviate the fi nancial burden of providing assistance to deprived persons. §6. CONCLUSION From the above analysis, it follows that the EU has diffi culties in reconciling the right to free movement of persons and to equal treatment as a fundamental right with a constitutional status on the one hand with the policy objectives of fi ghting poverty and social exclusion explicitly laid down in the Treaty provisions and policy documents on the other. As a result of European integration as an economic principle, economic migrants almost automatically have access to fi nancial support by the host state to help them avoid poverty. It demonstrates the resilience of the EU's market integration rationale and the dominance of 'mercantile' citizenship. 100 Yet, we see that the most recent case law seems to impose prior integration conditions on economic migrants as well. Conversely, noneconomic migrants face legal limitations on the fundamental right to free movement and to equal treatment. Th eir right to reside in a Member State depends on not being an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host state. Indigent EU migrants even face the risk of being expelled from the Member State where they reside because of the burden they would place on the host state's social assistance system. 101 Limitations on their right to equal treatment for social minimum benefi ts may lead to destitution as a consequence of the exercise of the fundamental right to free movement.
It appears that the EU conditions imposed upon economically active as well as inactive migrants to obtain the right to reside in and to social benefi ts from the host state are not based on a genuine sense of solidarity. Th is is the case even though Union law 'establishes a certain degree of fi nancial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States' as the Court stated in Grzelczyk 102 and which it applied in the abovementioned citizenship case law. Th e discussions about the impact of EU law on the boundaries of national solidarity systems question the extent to which European integration can legitimately contribute to a cross-border form of solidarity between Member States and their citizens. Th e fundamental right to free movement as well as to equal treatment seems to confl ict with the traditional territorial understanding of interpersonal solidarity which presupposes 'the "willingness" of citizens to share with "others" within the same "political community"'. 103 Such a willingness seems to be the pre-condition to create a solidarity mechanism of its own which aims at preventing and alleviating destitution by redistributing resources at EU level.
Apart from the structural funds, the EU currently lacks a redistribution instrument and criteria for distributive justice. As Poiares Maduro has put it: 'Th is limited version of the European social self does not really recognise Europe's right and legitimacy to establish and exercise and independent redistributive function'. 104 Hence, European citizenship continues to lack the 'social' dimension as identifi ed by Marshall. 105 Th is is still the domain of the Member States. It explains the ambiguity between free movement and the combating of poverty on the one hand, and the Member States' concerns to protect their social systems from 'foreign intruders' on the other. It also contrasts with the US federal integration process which has created a shared responsibility for welfare with the US Constitution, thus enabling the federal government to adopt redistributive policies via tax-and-spend power. In the US, poverty problems caused by the 'migrating poor' are perceived as issues requiring cooperation of the states and the federal government, based on a sink-or-swim-together rationale, which no longer entitles states to exclude indigent migrants coming from other US states who want to reside on their territory from social assistance. 106 A comparable redistributive system is still lacking at EU level, the introduction of which would need a stronger political commitment to an EU-wide fi ght against poverty and social exclusion and the will to transfer powers and fi nancial resources to the EU. Th e recently established Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived is a modest fi rst example of how the EU could possibly take more redistributive initiatives. However, it remains to be seen if the EU will be able to develop more advanced redistribution systems. Meanwhile, the right to social minimum benefi ts for migrant EU citizens will remain nested in the national systems and the nation-bound forms of solidarity. 107 In this context, the EU cannot but take into account the Members States' wish to protect their welfare states from intruders. Th erefore, the EU will continue to struggle with the ambiguity of its legal instruments and policy goals and will remain far from the objective which van der Mei formulated as follows: 'When taken seriously, Union citizenship ought to be developed in such a way that both the "rich and the poor" can enjoy the rights that come with it.' 108 
